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IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
The only interested parties are named in the caption 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is there any evidence to support the trial court's 
Finding that the health of the Respondent Husband is "precarious" 
and that he has "heart problems"? 
2. In view of the Appellant Wife's ill health and 
minimal earning capacity compared with the Respondent Husband's 
demonstrated substantial earning capability, is the trial court's 
alimony award of $600 per month adequate? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
arbitrarily ordering the parties to divide their personal 
property by sequentially selecting items from a list without any 
review by the Court or consideration of the nature and types of 
assets involved? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
ordering that the right to "control the sale" and the occupancy 
of the parties1 primary residence shift back and forth between 
the parties every six months until it was sold? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action involving a fourteen-year 
marriage. There were no children born during the marriage so 
there is no issue as to custooy. A one-day hearing was held 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on January 3, 1985, after 
which the court entered a Memorandum Decision (R. at 95-102 infra 
at A-2 through A-9), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
at 104-14, infra at A-10 through A-20), and a Decree of Divorce 
(R. at 115-20 infra at A-21 through A-26). Thereafter, a Motion 
to Alter or Amend (R. at 121-24) and a Supplemental Motion to 
Alter or Amend (R. at 127-30) were filed by Appellant Janet 
Ruhsam. These Motions were heard by the trial court on May 13, 
1985, and an Order was entered on May 16, 1985, (R. at 143-44) 
making minor technical changes - iginal Fit:iciings and 
Decree but otherwise denying the motion. Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 145-54 infra at A-27 through 
A-36) anI an Amended Decree of Divorce • I" :-50 infra at 
A-37 through A-42) were signed and entered by the trial court. 
This appeal is from the alimony and property distribution 
provisions of the Amended Decree. 
S1 r/i, i EMEN i oi 1 F \c rs 
The parties were married on December 18, 1970, and no 
children were born as issue of this marriage. Defendant-
Appellant Janet Elizabeth Ruhsam (hereinafter "Mrs. Ruhsam") is 
forty-nine years of age (R. at 248) and a high school graduate 
R. at 249). Prior to her marriage, she was employed as a 
beautician (R. at 224); however, upon her marriage to Plaintiff-
Respondent Hugh :\ Vonzell Ruhsam, Jr. (hereinafter "Mr. Ruhsam"), 
he insisted that she give up her work (R. at 249), it 
being the intention of the parties that she would be an "Air Force 
wife" and follow her husband around as his duty was transferred 
(R. at 243, 250). During the marriage, Mrs. Ruhsam had no real 
employment other than as a saleslady for A v oi: i Prodi icts (R. at 
243), from which endeavor she earned only $1,600 in 1984 (R. at 
255) and never earned more than $4,000 per year (Id.). 
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Unfortunately, Mrs. RuhsanTs health has been extremely 
poor. In 1977, she was diagnosed as having cancer of the left 
breast and underwent a radical mastectomy in Texas. (R. at 189.) 
In 1984, she was diagnosed as having cancer of the right breast 
(R. at 254), and underwent a modified radical mastectomy of the 
right breast (R. at 189). According to the testimony of her 
physician, Dr. Lyle Archibald, in addition to enduring the 
considerable pain and emotional stress inherent in such surgery, 
Mrs. Ruhsam is at risk for a further recurrence of the cancer 
that has already necessitated two major surgeries in the past 
seven years. (R. at 189.) Dr. Archibald also testified that 
Mrs. Ruhsam must have frequent and expensive check-ups to monitor 
her condition (R. at 189) and is a candidate for reconstructive 
surgery (R. at 193). Because of her prior problems, Mrs. Ruhsam 
is unable to procure any health insurance (R. at 275). 
While her doctor feels that Mrs. Ruhsam could 
physically handle some light, sedentary activities (R. at 197), 
r.he continues to suffer pain from her surgeries, sinus headaches, 
migraine headaches, and "shooting pain" up and down her right 
arm. (R. at 256.) Mrs. Pubsamfs lower jaw is decaying seriously 
(R. at 256) and she has been advised that she will have to incur 
substantial expenses in the treatment of that condition (R. at 
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284). Additionally, she has an arthritic condition in both hands 
(R. at 256) and bursitis in her left knee (R. at 257). 
Obvious! >; .-.,.- fs realistic expectations of income from 
future employment must be severely limited. 
Mr. Ruhsam, on the other hand, is fifty-six years of 
age (R. at 226) and in generally very good health. Although the 
trial court found (Memorandum Decision, R. at 97-98 infra at A-4 
through A-5 and Findings .VI0, R. at 149-50 infra at A-31 through 
A-32) that leart problems, " Mr. Riitisam's test imony--the 
only evidence on the point--was that he had "no heart problem" 
(R. at 219), Mi , Ruhsam retired from the Air Force as a full 
colonel (R. at 216) and receives $2,941 per month in retirement 
and disability pay (R. at 239). He is also employed by Jetway 
(R. at 209), the company that manufactures the walkways that lead 
from airport passenger gates to the aircraft. He holds the 
position of marketing manager and is responsible for sales 
throughout Europe and the Middle East (R. at 225.) At the time 
of trial, he was earning j2,915 per month exclusive of fringe 
benefits (R. at 219), bringing his total monthly income to more 
than $5,850. 
While 5 11 D'*"hi 3 a i n is eligible * *  rtgage financing, 
Mrs. Ruhsam is not at 232); moreover, Mrs. Ruhsam could not 
purchase a home through conventional mortgage financing because 
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of her lack of income (R. at 274). The trial court ordered that 
the parties' principal residence and a second, smaller home in 
Roy, Utah, both be sold and the proceeds divided equally between 
the parties. Although the trial court made no findings as to the 
value of either of these major assets, the evidence is that the 
principal residence has a market value of approximately $98,000 
(R. at 178) and a mortgage encumbrance of approximately $41,400 
(R. at 206), leaving a net equity of approximately $53,600, while 
the smaller home in Roy, Utah, has a market value of not more 
than $55,000 (R. at 181) and a mortgage encumbrance of $39,700 
(Exhibit 8-D) leaving a net equity of $15,000 or less. Thus, 
after realtors1 commissions and costs of sale have been paid, 
Mrs. Ruhsam will receive considerably less than $30,000 for her 
share of these homes, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is simply no evidence to support the trial 
court's Finding that Mr. Ruhsam is in "precarious health" and has 
"heart problems." His own testimony was to the contrary and, 
when compared with the chronic and severe ill health 
unfortunately experienced bv Mrs. Ruhsam, his health can onlv be 
considered excellent. Similarly, the trial court's Finding that 
Mr. Ruhsam's income is between $2,000 and $3,000 per month fails 
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to adequately recognize that, in fact, he is earning at least 
$2,915 per month from his employment and receiving an additional 
$2,941 per month from his military retirement pay. On the other 
hand, Mrs. Ruhsam earned onlv $1,600 in all of 1984, is in ill 
health, and has not worked, in effect, in the fourteen years of 
her marriage. The trial court's Findings with resoect to Mr. 
Ruhsam's health are contrary to the evidence and the trial 
court's award of $600 per month in alimony is totally inadequate 
based upon the needs of Mrs. Ruhsam and the demonstrated income 
potential of Mr. Ruhsam. 
The property distribution ordered by the trial court is 
in abuse of discretion. The trial court failed to place values 
on the parties1 two homes, their most substantial assets. 
Instead, the trial court ordered that both be sold. The sale of 
both of these assets will result in less than $30,000 to Mrs. 
Ruhsam, who is ineligible for VA mortgage financing and cannot 
qualify for conventional mortgage financing because of her very 
limited income. Thus, she is deprived of any means to acquire 
housing, other than to rent, which will deplete her assets 
further. Moreover, the trial court ordered that the both 
"control of the sale'1 and the occupancy of the principal 
residence vacillate back and forth every six months. The moving 
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expenses and logistical problems created by such an arrangement 
are unworkable and will further exhaust and deplete Mrs. Ruhsamfs 
very limited assets. 
Also an abuse of discretion is the trial court's ruling 
that the parties alternately select items of personal proprety 
from a list. While it was convenient for the trial court since 
it obviated any need to actually consider the distribution of 
these assets, it wholly fails to fulfill the trial court's most 
important function in a domestic relations case: the equitable 
distribution of the parties' assets so as to maximize the 
parties' financial resources. Since the trial court has failed 
to give any consideration whatsoever to the nature of the items, 
to which party has most need for the items, or to how the items 
can most effectively be divided, the trial court has utterly 
failed to fulfill its most important function. The procedure 
fashioned by the trial court is entirely arbitrary and it is a 
gross abuse of the trial court's discretion. It is truly as 
fallacious as King Solomon's Biblical custody determination. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT, INDEED IT 
REFUTES, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AS TO MR. RUHSAM'S HEALTH. 
Both the Memorandum Decision (R. at 95-102, infra at 
A-2 through A-9) and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(as amended) (R. at 145-54, infra at A-27 through A-36) 
appropriately emphasize that the fTphysical health and earning 
capacity of each of the parties is important" to the 
determination of alimony. Having correctly noted the importance 
of the health and earning capacity of the parties, the trial 
court then erroneously found that Mr. Ruhsamfs health was 
"precarious" and that he had a "heart condition and other health 
problems." In fact, Mr. Ruhsam's only health problem of which 
there is any evidence in ^his case is that he has "a mild case of 
hypertension." (R. at 218.) Despite a leading auestion 
suggesting that he had "heart problems," Mr. Ruhsam testified 
that he did not: 
Mr. Vlahos: Hugh, would you tell the Court, if 
you would please, what is the—what is 
the status of your health at this point? 
Answer: Well, I have a mild case of 
hypertension. And other than that it's 
fairly good, I assume. I'm due for a 
physical tomorrow and I can find out more. 
Question: Do you have high blood pressure? 
Answer: Yes, I do. 
Question: Are you being treated for that? 
Answer: Yes, I take medication. 
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Question: And are you also having some heart 
orob]em9 
Answer: Other than the high blood pressure, no 
heart problems. 
R. at 218-19. Simply stated, this evidence, the only evidence 
relating to Mr. RuhsanTs health, fails to support the trial 
court's finding that his health is "precarious" and that he has 
"heart problems." The trial court's findings in these critical 
areas are totally without support in the evidence adduced at the 
trial. 
Similarly misleading is the trial courtTs finding that 
Mr. Ruhsam's earning capacity "is somewhere between $2,000 and 
$3,000 per month." (Memorandum Decision, R. at 98, infra at A-5 
and Findings 314, R. at 151, infra at A-33.) In fact, Mr. 
RuhsanTs earnings (without considering fringe benefits) from his 
employment as the International Marketing Manager for Jetway is 
$2,915 per month (R. at 219), and when his additional $2,941 per 
month in retirement pay is considered (R. at 239), his income is 
almost $6,000 per month. 
In these important areas, the trial court's Findings 
can only be characterized as erroneous and without evidentiary 
support of any nature whatsoever. 
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POINT II, THE ALIMONY AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
NOT ADEQUATE. 
In this case, the husband is in good health and earning 
approximately $3,000 per month (exclusive of fringe benefits) 
from his employment as the international marketing manager for 
Jetway. In addition, he receives almost another $3,000 per month 
on account of his full colonel's retirement pay from the United 
States Air Force. In all, his monthly income is in excess of 
$5,850 per month. On the other hand, Mrs. Ruhsam was able to 
earn only $1,600 during all of 1984. She has not worked during 
the fourteen years of this marriage other than as a saleslady for 
Avon Products. Additionally, she has had two major cancer 
surgeries in the last seven years, resulting in two modified 
radical mastectomies. She has, naturally, had a great deal of 
pain from these operations and continues to have "shooting pain'1 
up and down her right arm. She suffers from sinus headaches and 
migraine headaches. Her lower jaw is decaying, she has an 
arthritic condition in both of her hands, and bursitis in her 
left knee. While her doctor feels that she may be able to handle 
some "light, sedentary activity," it is apparent that her earning 
capacity is severely limited. In light of these circumstances, 
the trial court's award of $600 per month in alimony, even when 
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coupled with her 15.55% share of Mr. Ruhsam's retirement pay, is 
clearly inadequate. This is particularly true in view of the 
fact that she can reasonably anticipate heavy medical expenses in 
the future and is unable to obtain medical insurance due to her 
poor health. Under the circumstances of this case, such a paltry 
alimony award constitutes an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
As this Court has frequently recognized, it is the 
necessary function of alimony to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
the marriage. For example, this Court noted in 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), that: 
The function of alimony is to provide supnort 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she en.ioyed during the 
marriage and to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge. Criteria considered in 
determining a reasonable award of support 
include the financial condition and needs of the 
wife, the ability of the wife to provide a 
sufficient income for herself, and the ability 
of her husband to provide support. 
615 P.2d at 1223 (footnote citation omitted). In this case, Mr. 
Rubsam continues to enjoy his demonstrated ability to provide a 
lucrative income. On the other hand, Mrs. Ruhsam, who is now 
fifty years of age, has not been employed to any significant 
degree since prior to this marriage fourteen years ago. These 
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factors militate strongly in favor of a substantial alimony 
award. Moreover, in view of the duration of the marriage, a very 
substantial alimony award is not only appropriate but essential 
to an equitable decree, T>4s is particularly true in this case 
since Mrs. Ruhsam gave up her earning capacity as part of her 
commitment to the marriage and her willingness to fulfill the 
role of 'an Air Force wife.1 
Similarly, in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 
1979), this Court observed that the function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage . . . . Important criteria 
in determining a reasonable award for support 
and maintenance are the financial condition and 
needs of the wife, considering her station in 
life; her ability to produce sufficient income 
for herself; and the ability of her husband to 
provide support. 
587 P.2d 147 (footnote citation omitted). Likewise, in Wilson 
v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1958), this Court, faced 
with a fifteen-year marriage, held that: 
The Court's responsibility is to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of [the 
parties'] economic resources so that the parties 
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis. In doing so, it is necessary for 
the Court to consider . . . an appraisal of all 
of the attendant facts and circumstances; the 
duration of the marriage; the ages of the 
oarties; their social positions and standards of 
living; their health; considerations relative to 
children: the money and property they possess 
13 
and how it was acquired; their capabilities and 
training and their present and potential 
incomes. 
296 P.2d at 979-80 (footnote citation omitted). Each of these 
factors demands a substantial alimony award for Mrs. Ruhsam in 
view of the length of this marriage, her questionable 
employability, the demonstrated earning potential of Mr, Ruhsam, 
and the fact that, during this marriage, she was expected to 
live, and has grown accustomed to, a life filled with social 
activity, charitable works, and little remunerative employment. 
It is not reasonable--and it is not consistent with the law of 
this state—that this woman should now be compelled literallv to 
fend for herself regardless of her ill health and her lack of 
earning capacity. 
In its very recent decision in Jones v. Jones, — 
P.2d — , 8 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1985), this Court reversed 
as insufficient a $1,000 per month alimony award. In that case, 
this Court noted that nother than the assets awarded to her in 
the property distribution, the wife has no assets and no outside 
income." -- P.2d at — , 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. This 
observation is equally true in the case now before this Court. 
In Jones, this Court also noted: 
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The wife has no independent income. It is 
entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in 
her mid-50's with no substantial work experience 
or training will be able to enter the job market 
and support herself in anything even resembling 
the style to which the couple had been living. 
— P.2d at — , 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. This Court then 
went on to hold, in language equally applicable to the present 
case, that 
The foregoing analysis leads inexorably to 
the conclusion that the trial court's alimony 
award was inequitable . . . . The wife is in 
her mid-501s, possesses few marketable job 
skills, and has little hope of retraining. This 
is simply not the sort of situation in which a 
decreasing rehabilitative alimony award is 
appropriate. The husband operates a financially 
succesful business, built up over twenty years 
of marriage through the joint efforts of both 
husband and wife. These facts clearly call for 
some sort of continuing spousal maintenance. 
The original award must be more substantial 
[than the $1,000 per month awarded by the trial 
court], considering the husband's real 
discretionary income, and should continue at 
that level for the foreseeable future. 
-- P.2d at — , 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. The $600 per month 
awarded by the trial court in this case is even more 
disproportionate than was the wife's award in Jones. The $600 
awarded by the trial court is inequitable and insufficient and 
must be increased. 
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POINT III, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FASHIONING THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IN THIS CASE. 
A. The Trial Court Erred In Ordering That The Occupancy Of And 
The Prerogative To Sell The Parties' Principal Residence Cycle 
Back And Forth Between The Parties Every Six Months. 
The Decree entered by the trial court in this action 
provides that both the parties1 principal residence and their 
Roy, Utah home be sold and the proceeds divided. (Decree at 16, 
R. at 157, infra at A-39.) The Decree also provides, however, 
that the occupancy of the principal residence, as well as the 
prerogative to "have control over the sale" of that residence, 
shall be vested in Mrs. Ruhsam for a period of six months and 
then, if the sale has not been accomplished in that time, Mr. 
Ruhsam shall have the occupancy and nthe right to effect the sale 
for the next six months.11 (Decree at JT7, R. at 157-58, infra at 
A-39 through A-40.) This aspect of the prooerty distribution 
constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court 
for two reasons. 
First, the vacillation of the occupancy and right to 
sell the residence is absurd and serves no useful purpose. 
Rather, it will cost the parties a great deal of money to move 
their belongings in and out of the residence every six months 
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until it is sold. Additionally, the concent of vesting in one 
party the right to control the sale of the residence, without the 
concurrence of the other or without any limitation upon the 
discretion, can only serve as a constant source of unrest pnd 
antagonism between these parties. In short, there is no evidence 
to support such a provision, it is economically unwise, and it is 
an abuse of discretion. 
Second, the order by the trial court that both of the 
partiesT residences be sold is an abuse of discretion because it 
fails to take into consideration the total inability of Mrs. 
Ruhsam to qualify for mortgage financing to purchase alternate 
housing for herself. Her income during the last twelve months 
was $1,600 and her income during the last two years combined was 
$5,600. She has chronic and serious health problems and no 
substantial work experience in the last one and one-half decades. 
She is not legally entitled to VA financing and she clearly does 
not qualify for conventional financing since she has no 
substantial source of income. Yet the trial court has ordered 
that both of the parties' residences be sold. This decision 
condemns Mrs. Ruhsam to renting her housing for the rest of 
her life. It is economically unwise, it is not necessitated by 
the financial circumstances of the parties, and it is an abuse of 
the trial court's discretion. 
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B. The Trial Court's Totally Arbitrary Distribution Of The Parties' 
Personal Property Constitutes AD Abuse Of Discretion. 
Both parties proposed to the trial court distribution 
schemes for thei- personal oroperty. (Exhibits 6D & 7D and 13P.) 
The trial court found both of these proposals to be 
unsatisfactory and entirely rejected them. (Memorandum Decision 
J4 at R. at 98, infra at A-5.) Rather than fashioning a workable 
distribution of the parties' personal prooertv, the tria] court 
arbitrarily elected to require the parties to sequentially select 
items from a list of the persona] property. (Decree JT12, R. at 
158-59, infra at A-40 through A-41.) The only precedential 
support for such a procedure is found in the Bib]ical custody 
determination of King Solomon and the trial court's decision in 
this cas. is no more appropriate and is equally abusive of its 
discretion. 
The procedure utilized by the trial court utterly fails 
to fulfill the most important purpose of the property 
distribution: to ensure that the parties1 resources are 
maximized to the greatest extent possible. The trial court has 
utterly failed to make any attempt to place these parties in the 
best possible position to continue with their lives. There can 
be no .iustification for such a procedure. It is a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
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POINT IV, IN THIS EQUITABLE ACTION, THIS COURT MAY 
REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS. 
While due deference must be extended to the views of 
the trial /judge who had a oersona.1 opportunity to observe the 
witnesses, this Court is by no means bound by the express or 
implicit Findings of Fact reached by the trial court. This is a 
domestic matter and, therefore, highly equitable in nature. In 
such an action, it is the duty of this Court to review and 
consider questions both of fact and of law. As noted in 
Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970): 
This is an equitable matter, and upon appeal 
the binding effect of the Findings made by the 
trial court differs from that in a law matter. 
We may here review questions of both law and 
fact; and after making due allowance for the 
advantaged position of the trial judge to 
observe the demeanor of witnesses upon the 
stand, we may be persuaded that a Finding is 
against the preponderance of the evidence to 
such an extent that we would be justified in 
disapproving it or even making a Finding of our 
own. 
469 P.2d at 505 (numerous citations omitted). In that case, this 
Court rejected the trial court's determination and reversed the 
trial court. Likewise in the present case, this Court cannot let 
the alimony and property distribution stand; they must be either 
reversed or remanded. 
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CONCLUSION 
The alimony and property distribution ordered by the 
trial court in this action are unfair to Mrs. Ruhsam. The trial 
court, in granting only $600 per month in alimony, bases its 
decision upon the perception that Mr. Ruhsam is in "precarious 
health" and has heart problems. In fact, there is no evidence to 
support either Finding and the evidence overwhelmingly 
demonstrates that Mr. RuhsamTs health is far superior to that of 
Mrs. Ruhsam, who has had two major cancer surgeries in the past 
seven years and has numerous chronic medical problems. 
Additionally, Mr. RuhsairTs demonstrated earning capability is far 
in excess of that of Mrs. Ruhsam. The award of $600 per month 
for alimony is so insubstantial as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion, particularly in view of the fact that it is based 
upon factual determinations unsupported by any evidence. 
Additionally, the trial court's decision that both of 
the parties1 residences be sold and that the occupancy and right 
to sell the principal residence vacillate back and forth between 
the parties on a six-month cycle is extremely prejudicial to 
Mrs. Ruhsam and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Not only is 
Mrs. Ruhsam unable to qualify for mortgage funds to purchase 
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replacement housing, she must move in and out of the house every 
six months until it can be sold. As a practical matter, she is, 
therefore, also deprived of any practical use of the house until 
it is sold. 
Similarly, the trial court's arbitrary order that the 
parties sequentially select items from a list of all their items 
of personal propertv is ill-founded and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. The role of the trial court is to maximize the 
economic resources of the parties but this arbitrary approach 
accomplishes nothing other than a physical separation of the 
assets. It results in a random distribution of the parties1 
assets rather than a logical distribution from which the parties 
may enjoy the greatest possible benefit. 
Defendant-Appellant Janet Elizabeth Ruhsam respectfully 
requests that this Court augment the alimony awarded to her and 
reverse the property distribution entered by the trial court. In 
the alternative, Mrs. Ruhsam requests that this Court remand this 
case to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate and 
augmented alimony award and with instructions to hear evidence 
and give consideration to the needs and circumstances of the 
parties and fashion a property distribution that will permit 
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Mrs. Ruhsam a place in which to live and maximize the economic 
resources of the parties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jv day of August, 1985, 
DART, ADAMSON & PA^K^I 
B. L. Dart 
By % ^ V > 
Jbhn D ^ a r k t e n M ^ 
\ 
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I hereby certify, as counsel for Appellant, that four 
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief n 
were served upon counsel for Respondent by mailing on the _f_-^ 
day of August, 1985, addressed as follows: 
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq. 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Counselfor ftnnellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTA 
, L ^ _ _. 
HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAMf SR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, 
Defendant, 
The two files (88670 and 88756) have been combined 
together for the purpose of this trial. The older one is the 
husband1s prayer for a divorce? the newer one is the wife's 
prayer for divorce* By stipulation, the parties have agreed that 
the two files would be combined into this one trial* The Court 
considers that they are combined into the older file* 
The parties stipulated that each of them would limit 
their evidence to a minimum showing of grounds for divorce. It 
may be that the reason for this stipulation was to limit further 
hard feelings and animosities. The parties have followed this 
stipulation during the trial. It is clear at the time of trial 
that each of the parties does intend to abandon this marriage 
relationship. It is also clear that neither perty is willing to 
make the concessions necessary for any possible reconciliation at 
this time. The Court, on the state of the evidence before it, 
must conclude that the divorce is the result of equal fault on 
both sides, and that the fault does not justify for any reason a 
change in property awards or alimony than would have been proper 
in a general case of parties in their situation divorcing one 
another because of equal fault. ( 
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Case No. 88756 
FACTS 
1. Each of the parties have grounds for divorce and 
each is awarded a divorce to become final of the expiration of 
the statutory waiting period. The grounds for divorce is mental 
cruelty. The cruelty is the abandonment of the marriage. 
2. Mr. Ruhsam had been married before and had three 
children. Mrs. Ruhsam had been married, but had no children. 
The parties met and married while Mr. Ruhsam continued to pay his 
child support. This was fully anticipated by both parties at the 
time of the marriage. The fact that some of the resources were 
used to pay his child support should neither increase nor 
decrease the property awarded at this time to either party. 
3* The parties have been married for approximately 14 
years. Most of the property accumulated or that now exists is 
the result of the earnings of the husband. This fact should 
neither increase nor decrease the award to either party. At the 
time of the marriage it was anticipated that she would follow him 
at the various air force bases and be an air force wife. Such 
plan would normally interfere with her earning power. The 
parties merge together their resources/ and the Court views the 
conduct of the parties to be that which would be deemed to have 
created what is tantamount to a partnership from that day 
forward. Neither party preserved the rights in any of the 
properties which they held before their marriage as against the 
otherf and each earning an equal share of anything accumulated. 
A-3 
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This was their continued arrangement until unhappiness ensued and 
until after the husband left the air force. Since his leaving of 
the armed forces, his earnings have continued to be the principal 
source of the accumulation of properties, but she has also made 
an effort that was in accordance with her ability at that time. 
The Court deems the situation to be one in which each of the 
parties are entitled to approximately an equal division of the 
properties accumulated. The husband has earned a pension as a 
result of his service in the armed forces. The portion of the 
pension that he earned before this marriage should be regarded as 
his and his alone. There is some evidence that a period of 
courtship existed before the marriage took place but there is no 
evidence as to whether he was or was not married at that time, 
nor is there any evidence of a partnership arrangement involved 
in the property. This persuades the Court that it should not be 
regarded a partnership before the time of the actual marriage. 
His pension to the degree it was earned after the marriage should 
be viewed as joint property, with each party entitled to an equal 
share, in accordance with principles enunciated in previous Utah 
decisions. She is awarded her share on that basis and he should 
be ordered to sign the necessary papers and/or allotments to 
cause that sum to be paid to her directly. The physical health 
and earning capacity of each of the parties is important in the 
Court1s determination on the issue of the award of alimony. His 
health is somewhat precarious, in that he is clearly the older of 
A-4 
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the two. His health is also precarious in the sense that he has 
a heart condition and other health problems. His earning 
capacity at this time is somewhere between $2,000 and $3,000 per 
month. Her earning capacity would normally be enhanced by the 
fact that she is younger, in fact the findings of fact should 
recite the age of each. However, her health in the last four 
years has made her less employable. She has had cancer in one 
breast, which necessitated surgery, and a few years later in the 
other breast, which again resulted in surgery. She has also jaw 
and teeth problems. All of these events have produced a degree 
of stress that has, up to the date of trial, limited her earning 
capacity to about $200 per month. The degree to which her 
earning capacity v/ould return to that which she previously 
enjoyed as an educated woman is speculative at this time. The 
alimony award here made is made on the hypothesis that his 
earnings will be between $2,000 to $3,000 per month and her 
earnings will be in the neighborhood of $200 per month both for 
the foreseeable future. Any gross material change in the earning 
capacity of these parties might well result in a change in the 
alimony award here made. The Court fixes the alimony here 
awarded at $600 per month, that should be taxable to her as 
income and should continue until further order of the Court. 
4. The Court has considered at length how the division 
of properties might be made. The Court deems the suggested divi-
sion of each side to be plagued by self-interest. The Court 
A-5 
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encourages the parties to attempt to negotiate the details of the 
division during the next 3u Jays. If they hc.ve not arrived at a 
detail split in accordance with the general principle that every-
thing is to be divided equally, the Court will attempt to make 
such an outline. This division is predicated on the Court's 
conclusion as indicated below: 
(a) The husband's testimony is correct insofar as it 
describes the division of property which was made to make the 
holdings safe from his former wife. The division which he has 
testified to as having occurred up to this time as an equal split 
of the properties then considered is accepted by the Court. 
(b) The division of the real property should be made in 
an equal basis on the principle of that which can be finally 
realized after sale. The Court orders both properties sold, she 
may control the sale of the home she now lives in for the next 
six months, if she has not completed the sale by thenf the 
husband may have occupancy and a right to effect the sale for the 
next six months. The husband may control the sale of the other 
real estate. The total resulting from all of the Leal estate 
shall be credited equally to each party. 
(c) All cash reserves as they existed on the day of the 
trial are to be divided equally. 
(d) The division of the automobiles presents a particu-
lar difficulty. The Court concludes that the division is to be 
as follows: he is to declare the value that he puts upon the 
A-6 
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the parties cannot do this without supervision the Court will 
orrfci: them to appear at the court at a time set and the selec-
tions will be monitored by either the Court or one of the court 
personnel designated to monitor the choosing* 
(f) It appears to the Court that each party will have 
resources from which they could pay their attorney. Each party 
must compensate their own attorney. The debts that existed at 
the time of their separation shall be paid from the joint assets 
of the parties. Each party will pay those debts which they have 
accumulated since the filing of the divorce. 
(g) The Court orders that before the distribution of 
the cash reserves are made, there shall be charged against the 
husband the sum of $6f500 which is to be represented as the 
membership in the Ogden Golf and County Club, which he is 
awarded. 
DATED this / C>day of January, 1985. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
<n 
HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAM, SR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV? 
CONSOLIDATED CIVIL NOS. 
88670 & 88756 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
3rd day of January, 1985, before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in 
person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the 
Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, Jane A. 
Marquardt, and it having been shown that each of the parties 
had filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter, and the 
Defendant's Complaint having served as an Answer and Coun-
terclaim, and the parties having stipulated that the two 
cases be consolidated and • that the parties would limit 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah; a rental home located at 
2079 West 3900 South in Roy, Utah, said home presently up 
for sale; household furniture and furnishing, appliances, a 
1981 Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile, which Defendant esti-
mates has a value of $5,987.50, and a 1976 Datsun truck and 
shell, valued at $1,725.00; membership at the Ogden Golf and 
Country Club, valued at $6,500.00, exclusive of transfer 
fee; a home located at 1865 East 5775 South in South Ogden, 
Utah, which has been sold and that the parties have previ-
ously divided gold coins, silver coins, silver bullion, old 
bullion, E.F. Hutton cash reserve and that each of the 
0 parties have these items in their possession. 
>ziu r % 523 
-J^ fij 6. That during the course of the marriage, the 
>DQJ5 parties herein have incurred a debt due and owing on the 
P!J*Q family home located at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Utah; the 
-
1
 mortgage due and owing on the home located at 2079 West 2900 
South in Roy, Weber County, Utah, and that the parties have 
each incurred debts and obligations since the separation. 
7. That the Plaintiff is retired from the United 
States Air Force, having retired on April 30, 1979 , with 26 
years, 11 months, or a total of 323 months, and that the 
parties were married 8 years, 4% months, or 100 months 
during the time the Plaintiff was in the military, or 
approximately 31.1% while Plaintiff was in the military. 
8. That the Plaintiff had been married before, and 
had three children. That the Defendant had been married, 
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in accordance with her ability at that time. The Court 
deems the situation to be one in which each of the parties 
are entitled to apprrv*lately an equal division of the 
properties accumulated. The Plaintiff has earned a pension 
as a result of his service in the armed forces. That 
portion of the pension that Plaintiff earned before this 
marriage should be regarded as his and his alone, said 
portion being 68.9%, and 31.1% of the retirement accumulated 
in the marriage. There is seme evidence that a period of 
courtship existed before the marriage took place but there 
is no evidence as to whether he was or was not married at 
the time, nor is there any evidence of a partnership ar-
rangement involved in the property. The Court is persuaded 
that it should not be regarded as a partnership for the time 
of the actual marriage. Plaintiff's pension to the degree 
was earned after the marriage should be viewed as joint 
property, with each party entitled to any equal share, said 
portion being 31.1% and should be shared in accordance with 
the principles enunciated in the Utah decisions specifically 
Woodward v. Woodward. Defendant is awarded her share on 
that basis, and Plaintiff should be ordered to sign the 
necessary papers and/or allotments to cause that sum to be 
paid to her directly. 
10. The physical health and earning capacity of each 
of the parties is important in the Court's determination on 
the issue of alimony. Plaintiff's health is somewhat 
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here made. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact, the Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, is entitled to 
a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH 
RUHSAM, and the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, is 
entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P. 
RUHSAM, same to become final 3 months from the signing and 
entry with the Court. 
2. THat the Defendant is awarded 15.5% of the Plain-
tiff's Military retirement as her sole and separate proper-
ty, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are neces-
sary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the 
Defendant. 
3. That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintiff's 
retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.5% net, and if 
Defendant receives 15.5% of the gross, she will be responsi-
ble for her own taxes. 
4. That the Defendant is granted the sum of $600.00 
per month as and for alimony, said alimony shall continue 
until the further order of the Court and shall be taxable to 
the Defendant as income, said alimony being based on the 
Plaintiff's earnings of between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 per 
month, and the Defendant's earnings being $200.00 per month, 
and any gross material change in the earning capacity of 
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11. That the Plaintiff is shall be awarded the 1976 
Datsun truck and shell, valued at $1,725.00, and the Defen-
dant is hereby awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile which the Defen-
dant values at $5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall 
be charged with the values of these sums, unless either 
feels the figure is unfair, and that each must declare 
within 10 days what is its value, which both have done, and 
that the Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the 
assets, and Defendant keep her car as her share of the 
assets towards the total distribution of the assets on a 
fifty-fifty basis. 
12. The Court grants to each of the parties, their 
individual wearing apparel, jewelry, makeup, and sporting 
goods equipment, with thf Defendant to be awarded the pets. 
13. That the Court then directs that the lists of 
personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the 
Defendant, shall be used as the basis, dividing said proper-
ty as follows: That the Defendant may choose one item, 
regardless of what that is, that is on this list which 
includes both what she things should be awarded to her, that 
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and 
that item will be awarded to her. The Plaintiff will then 
have a right to chose one item from said list, which shall 
be his. This procedure shall be followed until the list of 
property is exhausted. If the parties cannot do this 
without supervision, the Court will order them to appear at 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / day of March, 19 85, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by placing same m 
the United States Mail postage prepaid and addressed : 
Jane A. Marquardt 
Attorney for Defendant 
2661 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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PETE N. VLAHOS 
VLAKOS & SHARP 
Attorney for PlaintilT 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogdenf Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THF DISTRICT COORI nh WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
t 
v'y 
HUGH P. VON 9?MU RUHSAM, S 
PlaintiijL, 
vs 
JANET ELIZABETH ROHSnH 
Defendant. 
I 
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 i(l i I January, VJbb, be tore the Honorable John 1* 
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pet , u i u i i . e y , r ^ t e Vlanos, -^ ? the 
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*rvjLv*cr*i^ « co yrounas to a jjJ^ i^grce "~t£>^ a Iminimum in order to 
eliminate hard feelings and animosities, and each of the 
parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, exhibits having been offered a*.1 received, and tlxe 
Court having taken said matter under advisement and having 
rendered its memorandum decision in writing, and the Court 
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and 
having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
separately stated in writing. 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, is hereby granted a Decree of 
Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, and the 
Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, is hereby granted a 
Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, same 
to become final 3 months from the signing and entry with the 
Court. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGFD as follows: 
1. THat the Defendant is hereby awarded 15,5% of the 
Plaintiff's Military retirement as her sole and separate 
property, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are 
necessary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the 
Defendant. 
2. That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintiff fs 
retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.5% net, and if 
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tiff shall have occupancy of the home for 6 months and the 
right to effect the sale for the next 6 months* 
o. That the Plaintiff shall have control of the sale 
of the other real estate and the proceeds from the sale of 
both homes shall be divided equally. 
9. That all cash reserves as they existed as of the 
date ol trial, shall be divided equally between the parties. 
10. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the 19 76 
Datsun truck and shell, valued at $1,725.00, and the Defen-
dant is hereby awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile which the Defen-
dant values at $5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall 
be charged with the values of these sums, unless either 
feels the figure is unfair, and that each must declare 
within 10 days what is its value, which both have done, and 
that the Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the 
assets, and Defendant keep her car as her share of the 
assets towards the total distribution of the assets on a 
fifty-fifty basis. 
11. The Court hereby grants to each of the parties, 
their individual wearing apparel, jewelry, makeup, and 
sporting goods equipment, with the Defendant to be awarded 
the pets. 
12. That the Court hereby directs that the lists of 
personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the 
Defendant, shall be used as the basis, dividing said 
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item, regardless of what that is, that is on this list which 
includes both what she things should be awarded to her, that 
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and 
that item will be awarded to her. The Plaintiff shall then 
have a right to chose one item from said list, which shall 
be his. This procedure shall be followed until the list of 
property is exhausted. If the parties cannot do this 
without supervision, the Court will order them to appear at 
the Court at a time set, and the selections will be moni-
tored by either the Court, or one of the Court personnel 
designated to monitor the choosing. That the Plaintiff 
shall hereby be awarded the Ogden Golf and Country Club 
membership, valued at $6,500.00, and shall be charged that 
sum prior to the distribution of the cash reserves, so that 
each will share equally. 
13. That those debts that existed at the time the 
parties separated, shall be paid from the joint assets of 
the parties, but that each of the parties shall pat those 
debts that they have accumulated since the filing of the 
divorce. 
14. That each of the parties are ordered to assune and 
pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
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U HONORABLE JOHN F."WAHLQUIST 
District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7-^" day of March, 1985, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
DECREE OF DIVORCE by placing same in the United States Mail 
postage prepaid and addressed : 
Jane A. Marquardt 
Attorney for Defendant 
2661 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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PETE N. VLAHOS 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621 2464 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAM, SR., 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Consolidated Civil Nos, 
88670 & 88756 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
3rd day of January, 1985, before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in 
person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the 
Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, Jane A. 
Marquardt, and it having been shown that each of the parties 
had filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter, and the 
Defendant's Complaint having served as an Answer and Coun-
terclaim, and the parties having stipulated that the two 
cases be consolidated and that the parties would limit 
evidence to grounds to a divorce to a minimum in order to 
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eliminate hard feelings and animosities, and each of the 
parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, and the 
Court having taken said matter under advisement and having 
rendered its memorandum decision in writing, and the Court 
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and 
the Court having previously entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce, now enters the 
following Amended Findings and Conclusions in order to 
reflect the court's orders of May 13, 1985: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff has been an actual and bona 
fide resident of Weber County, State of Utah for at least 
three (3) months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, on or about the 18th day of 
December, 1970, and ever since said time, have been and 
still are husband and wife. 
3. That there are no children born as issue of 
this marriage and none are expected* 
4. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff 
cruelly, and that the Plaintiff has treated the Defendant 
cruelly, in that both parties have argued, are unable to get 
along and that each has given up on saving the marriage, 
rendering further marital relations between the parties 
herein intolerable. 
5. That during the course of the marriage, the 
parties herein have acquired a home, located at 1686 Mohawk 
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Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah; a rental home located at 
2079 West 3900 South in Roy, Utah, said home presently up 
for sale; household furniture and furnishings, appliances, a 
1981 Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile, which Plaintiff esti-
mates has a fair market value of $6,350.00 and Defendant 
estimates has a value of $5,987.00, and a 1976 Datsun truck 
with shell, valued at $1,725.00; membership at the Ogden 
Golf and Country Club, valued at 56,500.00, exclusive of 
transfer fee; a home located at 1865 East 5775 South in 
South Ogden, Utah, which has been sold and that the parties 
have previously divided gold coins, silver coins, silver 
bullion, old bullion, E.F. Hutton cash reserve and that each 
of the parties have these items in their possession. 
6. That during the course of the marriage, the 
4 
parties herein have incurred a debt due and owing on the 
family home located at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Utah; the 
mortgage due and owing on the home located at 2079 West 3900 
South in Roy, Weber County, Utah, and that the parties have 
each incurred debts and obligations since the separation. 
7. That the Plaintiff is retired from the United 
States Air Force, having retired in April 30, 1979, with 26 
years, 11 months, or a total of 323 months, and that the 
parties were married 8 years, 4V£ months, or 100 months dur-
ing the time the Plaintiff was in the military, or approxi-
mately 31.1% while Plaintiff was in the military. 
8. That the Plaintiff had been married before, and 
had three children. That the Defendant had been married 
FINDINGS OF FACT A-29 
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but had no children. The parties met and married while the 
Plaintiff continued to pay his child support. This was 
fully anticipated by both parties at the time of the mar-
riage. The fact that some of resources were used to pay his 
child support, should neither increase nor decrease the 
property awarded by the Court. 
9. That the parties have been married for approxi-
mately 14 years. Most of the property accumulated or that 
which now exists is a result of the earnings of the husband. 
This fact should neither increase nor decrease the award to 
either party. At the time of the marriagef it was antic-
ipated that the Defendant would follow the Plaintiff at the 
various air force bases, and be an air force wife. Such 
plan would normally interfere with the Defendant's earning 
power. The parties merged together their resources, and the 
Court views that the conduct of the parties to be that which 
would be deemed to have created what is tantamount to a 
partnership from that day forward. Neither party preserved 
the rights of any of the properties which they held before 
this marriage as against the other, and each earning an 
equal share of anything accumulated. This was the parties 
continued arrangement until unhappiness ensued and until 
after the Plaintiff left the air force. Since the Plain-
tiff's leaving of the air force, his earnings have continued 
to be the principal source of the accumulation of prop-
erties, but the Defendant has also made an effort that was 
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in accordance with her ability at that time. The Court 
deems the situation to be one in which each of the parties 
are entitled to approximately an equal division of the 
properties accumulated. The Plaintiff has earned a pension 
as a result of his service in the armed forces. That 
portion of the pension that Plaintiff earned before this 
marriage should be regarded as his and his alone, said 
portion being $68.9%, and 31.1% of the retirement accumulat-
ed in the marriage. There is some evidence that a period of 
courtship existed before the marriage took place but there 
is no evidence as to whether he was or was not married at 
the time, nor is there any evidence of a partnership ar-
rangement involved in the property. The Court is persuaded 
that it should not be regarded as a partnership before the 
time of the actual marriage. Plaintiff's pension to the 
degree it was earned after the marriage should be viewed as 
joint property, with each party entitled to any equal share, 
said portion being 31.1% and should be shared in accordance 
with the principles enunciated in the Utah decisions 
specifically Woodward v. Woodward. Defendant is awarded her 
share on that basis, and Plaintiff should be ordered to sign 
the necessary papers and/or allotments to cause that sum to 
be paid to her directly. 
10. The physical health and earning capacity of each 
of the parties is important in the Court's determination on 
the issue of alimony. Plaintiff's health is somewhat 
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precarious, in that he is clearly the older of the two, his 
health is also precarious in the sense that he has a heart 
condition and other health problems. The Plaintiff's 
earning capacity at this time is somewhere between $2,000,00 
and $3,000,00 per month. That Defendant's earning capacity 
would normally be enhanced by the fact that she is younger, 
that Plaintiff was born on January 1, 1929, and that the 
Defendant was born zn August 21, 1935, making the Plaintiff 
56 years of age, and the Defendant 49 years of age. 
11. That Defendant's health in the last four years has 
made the Defendant less employable in that she has had 
cancer in one breast, which necessitated surgery, and a few 
years later, in the other breast, which again resulted in 
surgery. Defendant has also jaw and teeth problems. All of 
these events have produced a degree of stress that has, up 
to the date of trial, limited her earning capacity to about 
$200.00 per month. 
12. i.'he degree to which her earning capacity would 
return to that which she previously enjoyed as an educated 
women, is speculative at this time. .The alimony awared here 
being made is made on the hypothesis that Plaintiff's 
earnings would be between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 per month, 
and her earnings would be in the neighborhood of $200.00 per 
month, both for the foreseeable future. The Court finds 
that any gross material change in earning capacity of these 
parties might well result in the change in the alimony award 
A-32 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 6 luO 
here made. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact/ the Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM is entitled to 
a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH 
RUHSAM, and that the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM is 
entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P. 
RUHSAM, said divorce to become final three months from the 
signing and entry. 
2. That the Defendant is awarded 15.55% of the Plain-
tiff's Military retirement as her sole and separate proper-
ty, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are neces-
sary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the 
Defendant. 
3. That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintifffs 
retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.55% net, and if 
Defendant receives 15.55% of the gross, she will be 
responsible for ner own taxes. 
4. That the Defendant is granted the sum of $600.00 
per month as and for alimony, said alimony shall continue 
until the further order of the Court and shall be taxable to 
the Defendant as income, said alimony being based on the 
Plaintiff's earnings of between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 per 
month, and the Defendant's earnings being $200.00 per month, 
and any gross material change in the earning capacity of 
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these two parties, may well result in a change in the ali-
mony award made. 
5. That the items of gold, silver and cash reserve 
management accounts that have already been divided, shall be 
accepted by the Court and considered as each having received 
1/2 of those assets. 
6* That the real property shall be made in the 
equal basis or principal of that which can be finally real-
ized after sale. 
1. The Court orders both the family homes located 
at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, and 2079 
West 3900 South in Roy, Weber County, Utah be sold, and 
after paying the mortgage and costs of sale, the proceeds 
shall be divided equally. 
8. That the Defendant shall have control over the 
sale of the home where she now lives, which is 1686 Mohawk 
Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah for a period of 6 months, 
and if the sale has not been completed by then, the 
Plaintiff shall have occupancy of the home for 6 months and 
the right to effect the sale for the next 6 months. 
9. That the Plaintiff shall have control of the 
sale of the other real estate and the proceeds from the sale 
of both homes shall be divided equally. 
10. That all cash reserves as they existed as of 
the date of trial shall be divided equally between the parties 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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XX. m a t the" Plaintiff shall be awarded the 1976 
Datsun truck and shell, valued at $1,725.00, and the 
Defendant shall be awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile which the 
Plaintiff values at $6,350.00, and the Defendant values as 
$5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall *"be charged 
with the values of these sums, unless either feels the fig-
ure is unfair, and that each must declare within 10 days 
what is its value, which both have done, and that the 
Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the assets, and 
Defendant keep her car as her share of the assets towards 
the total distribution of the assets on a fifty-fifty basis. 
12. The Court grants to each of the parties, their 
individual wearing apparel, jewelry, makeup, and sporting 
goods equipment, with the Defendant to be awarded the pets. 
13. That the Court then directs that the lists of 
personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the 
Defendant, shall be used as the Dasis, dividing said prop-
erty as follows: That the Defendant may choose one item, 
regardless of what that is, that is on this list which 
includes both what she thinks should be awarded to her, that 
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and 
that item will be awarded to her. The Plaintiff will then 
have a right to choose one item from said list, which shall 
be his. This procedure shall be followed until the list of 
property is exhausted. If the parties cannot do this with-
out supervision, the Court will order them to appear at the 
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Court at a time set, anci the selections will be monitored by 
either the Court, or one of the Court personnel designated 
to monitor the choosing. That the Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the Ogder* o^ "** and Country Cl'ib membership, valued 
at $6,500.00, exclusive of transfer fee, and shall be 
charged that sum prior to the distribution of the cash 
reserves, so that each will share equally. 
14. That those debts that existed at the time of 
the parties separation, shall be paid from the joint assets 
of the parties, but that each of the parties shall pay those 
debts that they have accumulated since the filing of the 
divorce. 
15. That each of the parties must assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs. ^ , s\ 
DATED this / // day of //1 f /L^CSl , 1985 
BY THE COU 
/ 
ApBPe^ed as to form: 
Ms 
/ . 
N P. WAHLQUI93' W/ ^\^f JOH
nastrict Court Judge 
JA'N&'A. MARQUAREtf! 
At^ornjay-^or Defendant 
Attorne n AHOS or Plaintiff 
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PETE N. VLAHOS 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kieb<il Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621 2464 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAM, SR., 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAMf 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AMENDED NUNC PRO TUNC 
Consolidated Civil Nos, 
88670 & 88756 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
3rd day of January, 1985, before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in 
person anu with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the 
Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, Jane A. 
Marquardt, and it having been shown that each of the parties 
had filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter, and the 
Defendant's Complaint having served as an Answer and Coun-
terclaim, and the parties having stipulated that the two 
cases be consolidated and that the parties would limit 
evidence to grounds to a divorce to a minimum in order %^to 
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eliminate Hard feelings and animCSl Lies1, and each of the 
parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, and the 
Court having taken said matter under advisement and having 
rendered its memorandum decision in writing, and the Court 
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and 
having made its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, separately stated in writing, now enters the following 
Decree of Divorce, amended nunc pro tunc: 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that 
the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, is hereby granted a Decree of 
Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, and the 
Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, is hereby granted a 
Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, same 
to become final 3 months from the signing and entry with the 
Court. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the Defendant is hereby awarded 15.55% of 
the Plaintifffs Military retirement as her sole and separate 
property, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are 
necessary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the 
Defendant. 
2. That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintiff's 
retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.55% net, and if 
Defendant receives 15.55% of the gross, she will be respon-
sible for her own taxes. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 2 A rv n 
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3. That the Defendant is hereby granted the sum of 
$600.00 per month as and for alimony, said alimony shall 
continue until the further order of the Court and shall be 
taxable to the Defendant as income, said" alimony being based 
on the Plaintiff's earnings of between $2,000.00 and 
$3,000.00 per month, and the Defendant's earnings being 
$200.00 per monthf and any gross material change in the 
earning capacity of these two parties, may well result in a 
change in the alimony award made. 
4. That the items of goldr silver and cash reserve 
management accounts that have already been divided, shall be 
accepted by the Court and considered as each having received 
1/2 of those assets. 
• 5. That the real property shall be made in the equal 
basis or principal of that which can be finally realized 
after sale. 
6. That the Court hereby orders both the family homes 
located at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, 
and 2079 West 3900 South in Roy, Weber County, Utah be sold, 
and after paying the mortgage and costs of sale, the pro-
ceeds shall be divided equally. 
7. That the Defendant may have control over the sale 
of the home where she now lives, which is 1686 Mohawk Lane 
in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, for a period of 6 months, and 
if the sale has not been completed by then, the Plaintiff 
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to effect the sale for the next 6 months. 
8. That the Plaintiff shaxl have control of the 
sale of the other real escau. n^d t*he proceeds fj.om the sale 
of both homes shall be divided equally. 
9. That all cash reserves as they existed as of 
the date of trial, shall be divided equally between the par-
ties. 
10. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1976 
Datsun truck and shell, valued at $1,725.00, and the 
Defendant is hereby awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile, which the 
Plaintiff values at $6,350.00, and the Defendant values it 
as $5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall be charged 
with the values of these sums, unless either feels the fig-
ure is unfair, and that each must declare within 10 days 
what is its value, which both have done, and that the 
Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the assets, and 
Defendant keep her car as her share of the assets towards 
the total distribution of the assets on a fifty-fifty basis. 
11. The Court hereby grants to each of the parties, 
their individual wearing apparel, jewelry, makeup, and 
sporting goods equipment, with the Defendant to be awarded 
the pets. 
12. That the Court hereby directs that the lists of 
personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the 
Defendant, shall be used as the basis, dividing said prop-
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erty as follows: That the Defendant shall choose one itemr 
regardless of what that is, that is on this list which 
includes both what she thinks should be awarded to her, that 
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and 
that item will be awarded to her. The Plaintiff shall then 
have a right to choose one item from said list, which shall 
be his. This procedure shall be followed until the list of 
property is exhausted. If the parties cannot do this with-
out supervision, the Court will order them to appear at the 
Court at a time set, and the selections will be monitored by 
either the Court, or one of the Court personnel designated 
to monitor the choosing. That the Plaintiff shall hereby be 
awarded the Ogden Golf and Country Club membership, valued 
at $6,500.00, exclusive of transfer fee, and shall be 
charged that sum prior to the distribution of the cash 
reserves, so that each will share equally. 
13. That those debts that existed at the time of 
the parties separation, shall be paid from the joint assets 
of the parties, but that each of the parties shall pay those 
debts that they have accumulated since the filing of the 
divorce. 
14. That each of the part es are ordered to assume 
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and pay their own attorney fees and costs 
DATED this day of 
Approved as to form: RD 
j£k> Ul JApE A. MARQUARDT 
Ab'torney^or Defendant 
(^ J|5£E^ fl.' 
Attorney/for Plaintiff 
^K)HN-F. WAHLQBT 
District Court Judg 
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